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INDONESIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND UNITED STATES
Philosophy is only a placebo for the bitterness of mankind's dark history.
- The SCO has six permanent members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and four current observer states: Iran, Pakistan, India, and
Mongolia. While Afghanistan's status as an observer is never clearly mentioned, they established a contact group in 2005. 2 The organization strives toward several objectives:
• Strengthening mutual trust and good neighborly relations;
• Promoting cooperation in politics, economics and trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, ecology and other fields;
• Safeguarding and preserving regional peace, security and stability; and striving for the creation of a new political and economic international order that is democratic, just and rational.
In addition to summit level meetings of all members, the SCO also conducts Karimov. During the meeting, they discussed Afghanistan's attempts to locate and bring to justice the terrorists who attacked Chinese workers there. 3 This paper tries to explore the SCO and the Indonesia-U.S. relationship from the Indonesian perspective. In doing so, this paper will examine SCO members and their interests, its strategic significance for Indonesia, Indonesia-U.S. relations, and future challenges facing this relationship. It will look at the bilateral relationships between Indonesia and SCO member countries with the caveat that Indonesia is neither a member nor an observer state, so it has no formal relationship with the SCO as an institution.
For Indonesia, the collapse of Soviet Union created a mixed opportunity. On the one hand, it created a golden opportunity for Indonesia, a prominent member of the Non-Aligment Movement (NAM), to have better relationships with other countries. On the other hand, Indonesia's relationship with the U.S. suffered because Indonesia was no longer on the priority list for U.S. foreign policy. As a result, the U.S. government imposed significant pressure on Indonesia to stay in line with the U.S. policy on democratization, human rights and free trade. The issue of Communism became irrelevant. Those U.S. policies combined with financial considerations slowly became the main focus also for the Western involvement with other countries. The relations between Indonesia and the U.S. have always been asymmetrical in nature, in the sense that the U.S. is much more important to Indonesia than Indonesia is to the United
States. For example, in 2003 the U.S. was Indonesia's second largest export market and its second largest source of imports. However, from the U.S. perspective, Indonesia is a small trading partner; U.S. exports to Indonesia account for 0.4% of U.S. total exports, and imports from Indonesia constitute only 0.8% of U.S. total imports. 4 During this same time, the creation of the SCO did not get significant attention from Indonesian policy makers. There are at least three reasons why few people noticed the development of this organization. First, Indonesia was struggling with its internal problems, such as the financial crisis in 1997 and the separatist movement.
Second, Indonesia did not have any significant diplomatic relationships with communist or post-comunist countries. Third, the Indonesian media also failed to consider the development of the SCO, so it was not brought to the attention of the people by media coverage.
More recently, the economic development in China and Russia in the last five years has attracted more Indonesian tourist and business travel to those countries.
These success stories have been reported by the Indonesian media, which in turn has forced the public to turn its focus towards those giants, at least from an economic perspective. At the same time, the U.S. military embargo on Indonesia has forced the Indonesian government to look for new sources for the Indonesian National Forces (TNI). For example, when Indonesia could not get spare parts for its F-16 fighter squadrons, which were acquired when the U.S. still supported Indonesia against the Communists, Russia offered their Sukhoi Su-30Ki to replace the F-16s in the Indonesian inventory. Despite the acquisition and training costs associated with transitioning to a new aircraft, the TNI had to accept the change in order to maintain an operational air force. 5 Interests of the SCO and Its Nations
The SCO members and observers cover one of the largest geographical areas of any regional organization, from Saint Petersburg to Vladivostok and from the Kara Sea in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south. Its members and observers collectively possess 17.5 % of the world's proven oil reserves, 47-50 % of known natural gas reserves, and some 45 % of the world's population. 6 It is interesting to note that on 15 14 China China's motives for the creation and exploitation of the SCO are mutual strategic reconciliation, including the avoidance of border clashes, and in establishing an orderly framework for coexistence with Russia. In addition, China sees the SCO providing access to an intriguing market for both goods and technologies, and as a source of energy. China also keeps pressing for an SCO free-trade area and is determined to eliminate its terrorism and separatism threats to help its own internal stability.
The Four Central Asian Member States
The SCO helps these member states to take care of security, maintain free choice Asian geopolitics and a forum to address their own problems, 15 to include resolution of their border disputes. Mongolia is trying to multilateralize its own highly asymmetric and sensitive strategic relations with China and Russia. 16 Finally, while not a formal observer, Afghanistan is interested in a relationship with the SCO to help control crossborder terrorist activity and illegal drug trade and to develop its economy on a sustainable regionally integrated basis.
The Strategic Significance of the SCO versus Bilateral Approach
The Strategic significance of the SCO The growing attention toward the SCO reflects the expanding power and assertiveness of its participants. The SCO fortunes have also risen with the recent booming in global energy markets as it brings China, the largest and fastest growing energy consumer, into a united organization with several of the largest energy producers. Even though some western analysts regard the SCO as a Sino-Russian led alliance against U.S. interests in Central Asia, which is not true if we look at the four small member countries interests, over the past six years the SCO has been evolving to not become an anti-American organization. However, despite these factors, from the Indonesian view the SCO remains a collection of nations with very limited importance as a multinational body. While some members of the organization (Russia and China) are very big players in the region, the value of the organization itself is less clear. As discussed below, even its members continue to work through other organizations as well, so while understanding the organization is important, focusing Indonesia's efforts on it would seem to achieve less that other bilateral efforts, especially because focusing on the SCO would alienate at least some US counterparts who will be key in regaining US support for Indonesia.
The Bilateral Approach
Traditionally, Indonesia has followed a bilateral approach to international relations, 20 In the defense sector, a draft agreement has been written which includes cooperation through exchange by both countries' military personnel to study defense systems and other forms of cooperation in the security as well as defense fields. 21 In the energy sector, the two sides agreed in 2006 that Indonesia's Tangguh gas field will provide 2.6 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually to southeastern China's Fujian province from 2009 to 2034. As Indonesia's President said, energy security is a "key factor in allowing China and Indonesia to achieve peace, stability and development." 22 The two countries are also improving cooperation in other fields, such as a scientific expedition in the Indian Ocean and extradition agreements. In short, current relations between Indonesia and China seem to erase suspicions that China's economic and military power will threaten peace, stability and prosperity in the short-tomid term.
The fluctuating relationship between Indonesia and Russia is also very dynamic. In the military sector Russia has already lent Indonesia US$1 billion to buy two submarines, four attack helicopters for the army, and six marine war vehicles. Indonesia also bought six Sukhoi jets from Russia, worth over US$300 million. 23 In space technology, the two countries have also agreed to cooperate in building a rocketlaunching station on Biak Island in Papua Province (because of the location's geographic importance close to the equator and geological value due to its rocky nature). A Russian company has also agreed to build Indonesia's first nuclear power plant in the Gorontalo Province. The nuclear plant would be designed to generate up to 90 megawatts 24 of electricity. Meanwhile, in the telecommunications sector Russia's Alfa is ready to invest US$2 million in Indonesia's fast growing telecom sector.
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Another example of diversification of economic ties in energy is the agreement between Russia's LUKoil's and Indonesia's Pertamina for US$1 billion worth of upstream work in Indonesia. 26 It seems that the Indonesia-Russia relationship tends to counter balance Indonesia's relationship with the U.S. that, while also welcome, has proven to be The Indonesian relationship with Tajikistan is also still very insignificant in value.
The Indonesian products marketed in Tajikistan 
Conclusion
This analysis has reviewed a complex situation involving the SCO, its members' interests and their strategic significance for Indonesia, and the Indonesia-U.S.
relationship and its future challenges. The conclusion is that Indonesia must continue to improve its human rights record, and the U.S. should proceed in reestablishing its relationship with Indonesia, including its military. Although many obstacles lay ahead, such as getting credit for meeting requirement the Leahy Amendment and unfinished Indonesian military reforms, there are many projected advantages to reengaging Indonesia. For Indonesia, the military is part of the nation, intact and respected by all elements of the nation. As a result of military reforms, the Indonesian military is not directly involved in politics, but their influence is still significant. Trying to marginalize the Indonesian military will not meet U.S. interests to create a strong democratic Indonesia as a regional counterbalance to China, minimizing the possibility of terrorist havens and access to an important source of natural resources. But if the U.S. chooses another direction, there is the possibility that Indonesia will continue its weaponry purchases from China and Russia. In the long term Indonesia will learn the different technologies and doctrine and move to a closer political relationship with China and Russia and other SCO members. Thus, arms sales for both countries not only become revenue sources but also will play a key role in the attempt to win friends and influence abroad.
Facing these challenges, Indonesian leaders should support the military reforms and transform its military culture, a culture that was shaped decades ago. It will require hard work, time and patience to adjust the Indonesian military to the latest developments in the spirit of military reform, a process that would be enhanced by increased Indonesian accessU.S. schools. The U.S. leaders should continue to seek the best way to reach national security objectives in the global war on terrorism and remember that the three main points which could hinder the creation of a professional military in Indonesia are not coming from the military side. Indonesia should understand that sometimes U.S. policy is solely for the short-term and domestic purpose, while U.S.
policy planners should understand the Indonesian culture, history and its civil-mililtary relationship and avoid short-term policies that conflict with long-term interests.
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